PRESS / GENERAL RELEASESnews desk

Advice for Members regarding situation in Gulf Region

4 September 2026

Gulf Region update 16 May 2026 - All-Member Security Briefing (video)

Gulf Region update 8 April 2026 - All-Member Security Briefing (video)

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8 September: Updated INTERTANKO advice for vessels in the Gulf Region and Red Sea

Following the latest developments, the INTERTANKO guidance has been amended to take into account the new reality facing shipping operating in the region. The amendments are shown below with changes underlined:

  • Follow the BMP Maritime Security, Industry Safe Navigation Guidance and report as required.
  • Follow the Industry Guidance for Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz.
  • Follow the advice of the JMIC and EUNAVFOR and avoid the area as much as possible until the situation is clear.
  • If possible, delay transits through the Strait of Hormuz until the situation is clearer.
  • Liaise with the USN NCAGS, EUNAVFOR and UKMTO and report suspicious activity.
  • Consider your AIS and LRIT policy in region and inform your flag State if no longer transmitting.
  • If passing through the area, to stay as far from Iran as possible, and 30Nm from US warships.
  • In the event of the implementation of any regional transit fees, owners should assess the associated sanctions, contractual and insurance risks
  • Ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz and following novel routes, such as the Southern Omani route, should only do so following thorough risk and navigational assessments, taking into account the very latest information from competent authorities and the PGSA non-Compliant Vessel List.
  • Following the ship specific risk assessment, when it is decided that it is safe to pass through the area, Masters should consider the possibility of encountering heavy traffic and continue to apply the COLREGs.
  • As jamming and spoofing of GPS and other GNSS is taking place, cross check against other methods.
  • Undertake a shipboard security drill.
  • Only rely upon information from trusted sources.

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Security Update 4 September: Stalemate remains with militaries operating on a hair trigger

Gulf Region 
A series of tit-for-tat attacks took place between Iran and the US starting on 1 September. Two seafarers were killed in one attack by Iran on a tanker, offering a reminder that seafarers remain in the frontline of geopolitical situations.

Militaries in the region remain at the highest level of readiness and will respond following provocation. Iranian attacks took place against US bases in Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain and Iraq. The US undertook attacks on multiple targets across the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) and in nearby naval bases. Additionally, the US attacked two Iranian-linked tankers in the SoH.

It is unlikely that any breakthrough or ceasefire will occur in the near future.

Red Sea
The Houthis have restricted their attacks on the Federal Government of Yemeni targets. No ships have been hit during the week, however, the situation can change very quickly.

Piracy
One ship, the Lutuf has been released following a reported payment of a multi-million dollar ransom combined with a Turkish-led military operation. Five ships remain in Somalia along with their crews.

Ukraine and Russia
The Secretariat has continued to exchange information with Ukraine regarding their targeting of ships carrying non-Russian and non-sanctioned Russian cargoes. Proposals to ensure ships’ safety when calling in the CPC terminal in Novorossiysk continue.

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Security update 28 August: US clears mines from the TSS, but uncertainty on routing remains

The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral Brad Cooper announced that US forces had cleared all mines from the internationally recognised Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH).

View INTERTANKO's statement welcoming mine clearance of Hormuz shipping lanes.

Iran has continued to attack shipping using the Southern route along the Omani coast. One tanker was hit by a missile on 26 August, albeit without injuries or significant damage. Multiple attacks have continued to be launched at shipping using that route and these continue to be intercepted by US forces.

In related news, on 24 August the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued an updated alert, warning shipowners and maritime service providers against engaging with three Iranian-linked entities demanding “toll” payments for safe passage through the SoH: the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), Persian Gulf Marine Insurance Company (PGMIC) and Hormuz Safe Marine Services Authority. All three entities have been formally sanctioned. 

The update sets out sanctions exposure for: US persons who are broadly barred from any dealings with Iran, the IRGC or Iranian digital asset exchanges; and for non-US persons who face secondary sanctions risk if their transactions cause a US counterparty (such as an insurer or bank) to breach sanctions along with potential civil and criminal liability. Notably, the alert also expands specifically on maritime service providers' obligations, urging them to conduct enhanced due diligence on any vessel transiting the SoH by reviewing voyage planning for signs of transit through Iranian territorial waters and directly asking counterparties whether safe-passage fees were paid or Iranian services (including insurance) were accepted.

In other areas:

Red Sea:
The Red Sea saw the first successful strike on a ship off the port of Yanbu in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). This KSA-flagged and owned vessel was struck with one missile on 24 August. A strike was also conducted against the port of Yanbu installations on 26 August without hitting anything. The Houthis appear to have restricted their targeting to only KSA ships and installations. This may only be a temporary measure and the targeting could be broadened without warning to any ship that has traded with the KSA.

Somalian piracy:
Six ships continue to be held by Somalian pirates, with all being small locally trading ships. Targeting of ships appears to remain opportunistic rather than directed at small vessels and BMP MS implementation remains a significant deterrent.

Black Sea:
Ukraine continues to attack ships trading in the eastern Black Sea. An INTERTANKO delegation met with the Ukrainian diplomatic mission to the UK and IMO to discuss this issue along with the means to remove ships from the Ukrainian sanctions list. Further consultations will occur including liaison with governmental authorities in Kyiv.

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Security overview – 21 August

Attacks continue in the Black Sea, Red Sea and Gulf region, with a resurgence in Somalian pirates adding to concerns.

Black Sea
Attacks on merchant shipping by Ukraine continue in the Black Sea. No tankers calling or intending to call at the CPC terminal in Novorossiysk have been attacked since the attack on the tanker Skiros on 16 August. Discussions are being instigated with the Ukrainian government regarding the possibility of a secure method to provide information on ships that intend to call at the CPC terminal. Through this process, it should provide owners a degree of assurance that their vessel will not be targeted by Ukraine for calls at the CPC terminal.

While attacks may have been limited on tankers, multiple bulk carriers and other cargo vessels have been targeted in the region. It is likely that the Ukrainians would have seen these ships as legitimate targets as they would have fallen within the targeting matrix for the Ukrainians by calling at Russian ports and carrying Russian cargo.

Red Sea
The ongoing conflict between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Houthis continues with both sides trading attacks. On 17 August, the Houthis targeted an uncrewed landing craft with six anti-ship ballistic missiles whilst it was in the Port of Mokha. Five hit the vessel, completely destroying it, indicating the capability of the Houthis to launch major attacks when they wish.

The various assessments from the military in the region remain that the Houthis are being very careful to only attack KSA targets including KSA and Yemen flagged ships. However, as previously seen, this targeting can change very rapidly.

Gulf region
Ships continue to be targeted in the Southern Route of the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) with at least four ships hit over the previous weekend. In an attack by Iran on a bulk carrier on 17 August the Chief Engineer was killed. It is not expected that there will be any reduction in the number of attacks and the JMIC threat assessment remains severe.

At the time of writing, President Trump has announced the threat through a significant package of sanctions against anyone providing support to Iran. Further details are expected to be announced on 24 August.

Somalian piracy
A sixth vessel, the Sibu 1 was hijacked by pirates on 20 August. This vessel is a locally trading small vessel which fits with the other five ships that the Somalians currently hold (refer to the list below). While the piracy has appeared to focus on these smaller vessels, this may just be because an attractive larger trading vessel has not been found due to the BMP and ship hardening, but this does not mean they may not try to attack.

Six merchant vessels remain held at the reporting date:

  • MT HONOUR 25, Palau-flagged product tanker: Hijacked 21 April 2026 off the northern Somali coast while en route to Mogadishu with oil products.
  • MV SWARD, Saint Kitts and Nevis-flagged general cargo ship: Hijacked 26 April 2026 off the northern Somali coast while bound for Mombasa with fertiliser.
  • MT EUREKA, Togo-flagged product tanker: Hijacked 2 May 2026 while anchored off Qana Port, Shabwa, Yemen with oil products.
  • MT ASANA, Tanzania-flagged product/chemical tanker: Hijacked 17 July 2026 approximately 65 NM southwest of Mukalla, Yemen with oil products.
  • MV LUTUF, Cameroon-flagged dry bulk/mini bulker 1: Hijacked 17 August 2026 off the coast of Somalia. Incident remains under investigation.
  • MT SEAMULL (SIBU 1), Eritrea-flagged tanker. Hijacked 20 August 2026 off the coast of Somalia in the IRTC. Incident remains under investigation.

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Security Update 14 August: Fatal attack highlights persistent threat

The past week has seen continued instability across key regions, reinforcing the need for vigilance and adherence to industry security guidance. Commercial shipping continues to operate in an environment shaped by military conflict, drone attacks, missile strikes and heightened geopolitical tensions.

Black Sea: Continuing attacks on port infrastructure
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues to affect maritime operations throughout the Black Sea region.

During the week, a bulk carrier was reportedly attacked off Novorossiysk and suffered damage following a fire onboard. Fortunately, the fire was extinguished by the crew, with no injuries or pollution reported. Additional attacks targeted infrastructure in Crimea, including the port of Yalta and the Syvash drilling platform.

Activity intensified further this week with Russian drone strikes against port infrastructure in Izmail and general cargo vessels in the port of Reni, Ukraine, while Ukrainian drone attacks were reported against Novorossiysk port facilities and naval assets. Although explosions and air defence activity were reported, there have been no confirmed interruptions to vessel movements or commercial port operations.

A potentially positive development emerged through reports that Ukraine has agreed not to target certain non-Russian tankers and Caspian Pipeline Consortium infrastructure associated with Kazakh crude exports through Novorossiysk. However, authorities have not provided further clarity, and the operational significance remains uncertain. (see separate article: ‘Security Advisory: Reports suggest easing of Caspian Pipeline Consortium targeting by Ukraine on certain non-Russian vessels’)

Operators trading in the Black Sea should continue to maintain a heightened state of vigilance and closely monitor official advisories and risk-area updates.

Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb: Fatal attack highlights persistent threat
The security situation in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb remains of significant concern.

The most serious incident of the week occurred on 11 August when a small general cargo vessel was struck by multiple missiles. Updated information confirmed six fatalities, including four crew members and two Yemeni Coast Guard personnel. Joint Maritime Information Centre (JMIC) assessments indicate that the attack was likely conducted by Houthi forces. The incident underscores the continuing threat faced by commercial shipping transiting this strategic chokepoint. Houthi sources reportedly claimed that the vessel was carrying military equipment, reflecting the group's ongoing attempts to justify attacks against commercial shipping.

Separately, an explosives-laden boat was reportedly destroyed near Mocha Power Station, while Saudi Aramco's Jazan refinery was targeted by an unmanned aerial vehicle attack. The resulting fire was extinguished without injury, and Houthi forces claimed responsibility.

Strait of Hormuz: Threat remains
On 13 August, two vessels were reportedly attacked while transiting the Strait. The situation has since been brought under control and no injuries were reported.

According to JMIC assessments, Iran continues to attempt attacks against shipping on a routine basis, while coalition and US forces continue defensive operations. The threat level remains severe.

US-facilitated transit operations continue to support commercial movements through the Strait of Hormuz, averaging 15 facilitated transits daily. Mine survey and clearance activities also remain ongoing, with efforts focused on expanding safe operating areas for commercial shipping.

Industry attention also remains focused on ongoing speculation surrounding a possible Iran-Oman maritime arrangement. Questions remain regarding route management, transit fees, sanctions implications, emergency response responsibilities, and navigational requirements. At present, the situation remains opaque, and no definitive framework has emerged.

INTERTANKO's security guidance remains unchanged.

Members are encouraged to continue following BMP Maritime Security guidance, applicable Industry Safe Navigation Guidance, and official advice issued by JMIC, UKMTO, EUNAVFOR and US NCAGS.

Given continuing threats, operators should carefully assess the necessity of voyages through high-risk areas, maintain robust ship security measures, conduct regular drills, and ensure navigational resilience against GPS jamming and spoofing. Particular attention should be paid to AIS and LRIT policies in affected regions, taking account of the latest guidance from competent authorities.

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Security Update 31 July: Update on conflict from Caspian Sea to the Gulf of Aden 

The security situation in the last week has both broadened and deteriorated. Ships and terminals were attacked in the Caspian, Azov, Black, Red and Mediterranean seas as well as the Gulfs of Arabia and Oman. Only the Gulf of Aden appeared stable following last week’s hijacking by Somalian pirates of a small locally trading product. The situation is detailed below:

Russia and Ukrainian war
The Ukrainian military has continued its campaign against what it sees as legitimate targets that support the military economy of Russia. Attacks have taken place on Iranian ships carrying cargo to Russia in the Caspian Sea as well as multiple continued strikes on Russian ships and infrastructure in the Sea of Azov. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal in the Black Sea and the port of Novorossiya has also suffered attacks from Ukraine, which have included strikes on tankers loading in the port as well as those waiting outside. It should be noted that these are ships carrying non-Russian Kazakhstani cargoes. Further, the two ships struck in Novorossiya on 30 July were not on any Ukrainian sanctioned list. In response to the Ukrainian attacks, Russia has targeted multiple ships in the Odesa [using Ukrainian spelling] region resulting in injuries on board.

The outlook for the Black Sea is that the Ukrainians will continue their attacks on what they regard as legitimate targets as they describe in a previously highlighted IMO circular letter where they state:

“…legitimate questions arise as to whether the activities of such vessels [those calling at Russian ports] can be regarded solely as ordinary commercial operations, separate from support for the military efforts of the Russian Federation”.

Houthis and Red Sea area
The Houthis have continued to threaten all shipping that has called in the Kingdom of Saudia Arabian (KSA) ports. However, while the only ships that have reported attacks so far have been KSA-registered ships, this does not mean that the Houthi threats can be ignored. Ships should continue to register with UKMTO and Aspides to ensure that their transits are closely monitored. The Aspides-linked naval vessels will be reduced due to a short gap in coverage as ships rotate in and out of the area. The port of Yanbu and the oil infrastructure in the KSA have suffered multiple attacks. While the port of Yanbu is reported to be continuing operations, other sections of the oil infrastructure have been reportedly damaged.

The outlook for the Houthis is that attacks on KSA ships will continue along with attacks on the wider oil production system. The threat to ships that have called in KSA ports will be present, but it is unknown if they will be targeted as much as direct KSA interests.

On a positive note, the announcement of the formation of the Multinational Defensive Maritime Coalition formed in Riyadh on 30 July consisting of KSA, Türkiye, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan, Djibouti, Somalia, Bangladesh, Yemen and the Comoros is to be welcomed. This will have its HQ in the KSA and be led by the KSA. In their founding statement they announced that:

To announce the establishment of the Multinational Defensive Maritime Coalition as a framework for maritime defense cooperation aimed at enhancing maritime security, safeguarding freedom of navigation, securing international trade routes and global energy supply routes, and protecting shared maritime interests in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, in accordance with international law, the relevant United Nations conventions, and internationally recognized norms.

The supporting members of this coalition will now need to ratify the agreement prior to the sending of any naval forces. Therefore, this should be viewed as a longer-term effort to resolve the situation.

Somalian piracy
No further piracy attacks have occurred since the seizing of the small locally trading product tanker Asana. It is unknown if this successful attack for the pirates represents a situation where they would be emboldened to undertake further attacks, or if this ship was the subject of some form of regional dispute rather than a pirate attack. However, ships have been subject to approaches by small groups of armed people operating on craft historically used as pirate skiffs and all ships are recommended to register with UKMTO and Operation Atalanta to receive the most up-to-date information in the event of an attack.

US/Iran war
The US completed 13 consecutive nights of attacks on Iran on 25 July. During these strikes, Iran responded with attacks across the region. Following this cessation of air strikes, a period of calm existed for a few days punctuated by threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). On the night of the 28 July, Iran launched attacks on US bases in Jordan. On the same night, the US and KSA launched joint attacks on Iranian backed Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq. Following the attacks by Iran, the US launched a comprehensive attack on Iranian sites across the country with a particular emphasis on facilities that could attack shipping in the SoH. These facilities had continued to launch drones at ships using the Southern Omani US-facilitated route. The US strikes appear to have lasted for only the night of the 29/30 July.

Iran has conducted talks with Oman regarding future administrative arrangements for the SoH. It has been widely reported that an Omani proposal backed by other regional countries for the setting up of a voluntary payment system was rejected by Iran. In the event of the implementation of any regional transit fees, owners should assess the associated sanctions, contractual and insurance risks.

The outlook for this conflict is unknown, veering rapidly between breakthrough and renewed air strikes. Between 10 and 20 ships continue to pass through the Southern route on a nightly basis, with similar or slightly fewer numbers through the Iranian-controlled northern route. In any event, registration of all ships in the Gulf region with the UKMTO continues to be encouraged.

Attack on SEGAS terminal in Egypt
On the 29 July, the SEGAS terminal in the port of Damietta on the Mediterranean coast of Egypt was attacked. The FSRU Energos Winter and a ship loading from it were both hit by drones resulting in fires on board. No injuries were seen and there was no loss of cargo containment.

The reason behind the attacks is unknown. The terminal is fed from an Egyptian gas field, with near exclusive supply to a Spanish energy company Unión Fenosa Gas, and the residual for domestic use. There were no links that could be identified to KSA, Israel, Ukraine, Russia nor Iran. One of the ships is part of a company that was US listed and some ownership is retained in the US. However, if this was an Iranian attack on a US entity, then there are many more easy targets to strike than this one. It is believed that the drones used were launched from either Libya or Sudan. Neither of those areas have been used by Iran. Without any group or country claiming responsibility, it will remain difficult to identify the attackers.

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Security update 24 July: Tensions rachet up in wider Middle East region

Gulf Region
On the 21/22 July multiple ships were attacked in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), resulting in two being abandoned. One of those has now drifted into Iranian waters and is now under the control of the Iranian government. The rhetoric between the Iranian and US administrations shows no sign of deescalation and gives all indications of being inflammatory. The US blockade has resulted in the near halting of Iranian exports and the usage of the US-managed Southern route through the SoH has fallen to single figures.

Unfortunately, fighting is expected to continue throughout the weekend with continued US strikes and Iranian counter-strikes.

Southern Red Sea
Following the announcement by the Houthi leadership of a blockade on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) ships and KSA cargoes, one KSA-flagged ship was hit by a Houthi launched missile on 22 July. This followed a KSA air strike on the Houthi airport in Sana’a which targeted the returning Houthi leadership from the funeral of the Iranian Supreme Leader. The announcement has been backed up with emails sent to many Members and VHF calls to ships in the region. The pertinent part of the email message sent by the Compliance Manager of the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) of the Republic of Yemen – Sana'a, states that:

“Given that your company owns, manages, and operates vessels, we would like to inform you that the Yemeni Armed Forces have decided to impose a ban on maritime navigation to and from Saudi ports. Accordingly, vessels are banned from loading or discharging cargo at or from any Saudi ports. This decision shall enter into force on 20 July 2026 at 15:01 Sana'a local time, corresponding to 20 July 2026 at 12:01 (UTC).”

The communication goes on to state that:

“Furthermore, they may be subject to targeting in any location within the operational reach of the Yemeni Armed Forces.”

It should be noted that the Houthis retain considerable levels of munitions including ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles. Further, whilst traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb has reduced by around 50%, multiple cargoes with a KSA origin have passed through the area.

The EU Operation Aspides remains in the area and has continued to provide support to shipping. All vessels passing through the area are recommended to register with the EU forces and UKMTO.

Amendments to INTERTANKO Guidance
Following the latest developments, the INTERTANKO guidance has been amended to take into account the new reality facing shipping operating in the region. The amendments are shown below with changes underlined:

  • Follow the BMP Maritime Security, Industry Safe Navigation Guidance and report as required.
  • Follow the Industry Guidance for Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz.
  • Follow the advice of the JMIC and EUNAVFOR and avoid the area as much as possible until the situation is clear.
  • If possible, delay transits through the Strait of Hormuz until the situation is clearer.
  • Liaise with the USN NCAGS, EUNAVFOR and UKMTO and report suspicious activity.
  • Due to concerns raised by JMIC following ships being attacked who are transmitting the AIS information, consider your AIS and LRIT policy in Southern Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz. If turning off LRIT, the ship’s flag State administration must be informed.
  • If passing through the area, to stay as far from Iran as possible, and 30Nm from US warships.
  • In the event of the implementation of any regional transit fees, owners should assess the associated sanctions, contractual and insurance risks.
  • Ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz and following novel routes, such as the Southern Omani route, should only do so following thorough risk and navigational assessments, taking into account the very latest information from competent authorities.
  • Following the ship-specific risk assessment, when it is decided that it is safe to pass through the area, Masters should consider the possibility of encountering heavy traffic and continue to apply the COLREGs.
  • As jamming and spoofing of GPS and other GNSS is taking place, cross check against other methods.
  • Undertake a shipboard security drill.
  • Only rely upon information from trusted sources.

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Security update 17 July: Further escalation in Arabian Gulf

The Arabian Gulf has seen a further cycle of violence with attacks on ships and shore installations. Two tankers were struck while transiting the Strait of Hormuz, resulting in multiple casualties and one seafarer killed. Another chemical tanker was struck by an anti-ship cruise missile while sailing in the Gulf of Oman; this latter incident appears to have been an error in targeting by Iran who fired at a warship and hit the merchant ship. Such incidents highlight the threat which extends across the whole region, from Kuwait and out into the Gulf of Oman.

US airstrikes against Iranian targets have continued throughout the week, focusing mostly upon Iranian infrastructure capable of attacking shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. The US also reintroduced its blockade on all ports in Iran and has extended it to cover any ship receiving Iranian products via ship-to-ship transfer. Iran has countered these attacks by striking US targets in multiple regional countries as well as some civilian infrastructure.

In response to multiple attacks affecting Indian seafarers, the Directorate General of Maritime Administration has issued circular number DGMA 36 of 2026 released on 15 July 2026 on measures affecting Indian seafarers. In section 4, b of this notice it states that:

“Ship Owners, Ship Managers and seafarer placement companies are directed to avoid deploying Indian seafarers on vessels undertaking voyages involving passage through the Strait of Hormuz until further orders."

It should be noted that this does not prohibit Indian nationals from sailing on ships passing through the Strait, however, steps should be documented to ensure that the threat to seafarers is analysed and overt permission is given by the seafarers.

While talks continue focusing upon the technical implementation of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed in June, there is no expectation that the tit-for-tat attacks between Iran and the US will be halted. Ships are likely to remain a significant target for Iran, with the latest attack taking place in the early hours of this morning (17 July) in the Southern route off Oman.

For the Southern Red Sea and the threat from the Houthis, the Joint Maritime Information Centre assesses that the Houthis are not preparing for attacks on ships despite the provocation following the attack on Sanaa airport by Saudi Arabia.

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Gulf Region Update 10 July: Reduction in traffic following fresh cycle of violence

Once again attacks have occurred on ships transiting through the Strait of Hormuz on 7 July.

This, in turn, prompted retaliatory strikes by the US and a continued cycle of the trading of blows between the two countries. The attacks by both sides have been stronger and more widespread than during other breakdowns of the ceasefire, which have also included considerable attacks on Bahrain and Kuwait. At the time of writing, the Gulf region appears to be quiet following two days of strikes, despite the unprecedented level of rhetoric from both sides.

Transits through the Southern route along the coast of Oman have dropped to single figures at the time of writing. Through the Northern route, along the coast of Iran, numbers are holding above 20 and the IMO’s self-styled evacuation plan remains on hold. Such movements are a long way off the 70+ transits seen following the signing of the agreement between the US and Iran.

Technical talks have continued between the US and Iran despite the words from the leaderships, which appear to be focused on both the nuclear aspects as well as the arrangements from the Gulf.

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Gulf Region Update 3 July: Slow but steady progress in Middle East talks

Face-to-face talks commenced in Qatar between the United States and Iran. The basis for much of the discussions is the agenda set by the MoU agreed between them. Since these talks have commenced no threats against, nor attacks on, ships have occurred in the Gulf region.

Since the attacks on the Ever Lovely and Kiku over the last weekend, traffic through the Strait has increased. This has been facilitated by the widening of the Southern route along the Omani coast, introduction of a two-way route, and the advice that navigational lights and equipment can be switched on during transit. Both the Northern and Southern routes have now reached approximately 50% of the pre-war level.

Planning for the international coalition continues, and INTERTANKO joined a briefing on the proposals on 2 July. These proposals are currently under development and need considerable input from industry prior to them being put into practice. They will focus around mine-clearance using the UK and German capabilities that are in the region with support from other countries such as the air component of the French naval force in the area.

The IMO evacuation plan remains on hold due to the lack of firm commitments from Iran to not target ships. It is hoped that this will be resuscitated or even morphed into a new system to support shipping.

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Gulf Region Update - Latest advice on transits through the Strait of Hormuz and wider Gulf region - 29 June

The following advice has been developed by INTERTANKO’s advisory group on security. New text is shown in bold and underlined.

  • Follow the BMP Maritime Security, Industry Safe Navigation Guidance and report as required.
  • Follow the Industry Guidance for Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz.
  • Follow the advice of the JMIC and EUNAVFOR and avoid the area as much as possible until the situation is clear.
  • If possible, delay transits through the Strait of Hormuz until the situation is clearer.
  • Liaise with the USN NCAGS, EUNAVFOR and UKMTO and report suspicious activity.
  • Due to concerns raised by JMIC following ships being attacked who are transmitting the AIS information, consider your AIS and LRIT policy in Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz. If turning off LRIT, the ship’s flag State administration must be informed.
  • If passing through the area, to stay as far from Iran as possible.
  • Do not pay fees for transits to Iranian forces. Decisions relating to compliance with PGSA requirements ultimately remain a matter for individual owners, who should assess the associated sanctions, contractual and insurance risks and seek advice where appropriate.
  • Ships passing through the Strait and following novel routes, such as the Southern Omani route, should only do so following thorough risk and navigational assessments, taking into account the very latest information from competent authorities.
  • Following the ship specific risk assessment, when it is decided that it is safe to pass through the area, Masters should consider the possibility of encountering heavy traffic and continue to apply the COLREGs.
  • As jamming and spoofing of GPS and other GNSS is taking place, cross check against other methods.
  • Undertake a shipboard security drill.
  • Only rely upon information from trusted sources.

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IMO pauses evacuation scheme as transits continue in defiance of Iranian threats

On 25 June, an Iranian drone hit a containership that was transiting outbound from the Gulf. Fortunately, no seafarers were injured in the attack. The ship was following the Southern Route along the Omani coast and was taking part in the US facilitated transits and was not taking part in the recently introduced IMO evacuation plan.

The IMO launched their evacuation plan this week, based upon the two established routes for ships to leave the Gulf. Information on the IMO scheme can be accessed here: https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/pages/middle-east-strait-of-hormuz.aspx

The IMO Secretary General speaking on 25 June stated:

“I have been informed of an attack today in the Gulf of Oman. Seafarer safety remains paramount. To ensure coordinated approach & navigational safety, the IMO evacuation plan will be paused until further clarity.”

Despite this attack, ships continued to transit through the Southern route with four ships entering the Gulf and 33 departing.

In the lead up to the attack, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were calling ships following the Southern route stating that only the Northern, Iranian, route was authorised under the joint agreement with the US. Despite the language contained with the agreement, this assertion by the IRGC is contested by the US and others. Further, the Omani government is able to put in place a route of their choosing in their territorial waters based upon their sovereign rights.

Intense diplomatic discussions continue and it is expected that the IMO evacuation plan will be restarted. Whilst that diplomacy continues, the US-facilitated route continues to support shipping. It is further expected that, due to the efforts of the US Navy to clear mines, the Southern route will be expanded to facilitate two-way routeing.

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Gulf Region Situational Update - 19 June

Following the signing of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran on the 18 June, multiple developments have now come into play.

Iran is now able to restart its exports of oil, gas and chemicals following the issuance of waivers for sanctions to be issued by the US, and the removal of the US blockade.

The Northern (Iranian) route is now in full operation and takes the form of two-sea lanes – use of this route is controlled by the Persian Gulf Straits Authority (PGSA). INTERTANKO suggests consulting with your ship’s P&I Club on whether any issues relating to non-US sanctions remain. The PGSA guidance can be downloaded here.

While the Northern route is open, it appears the Iranians are taking an active role in managing traffic. Overnight, 18/19 June, Iran called several ships stating that they do not have permission to transit.

The Southern (Omani) route is also in full operation and takes the form of a single recommended route, bounded to the North by a mined area and to the South by the coast of Oman. While this is open for all, the route is administered by the US. The US guidance issued by the JMIC can be downloaded here.

For the Southern route, the US has stated that ships do not need to register with them to follow it, however, due to its width, coordination is advised.

In other developments, it is expected that a mine danger area will be issued as a navigational warning through the NAVAREA 9 system on NAVTEXT. This is available upon request from the US, however, they are not freely distributing it at this time.

The IMO continues to work on its exit evacuation plan, which will focus solely on ships exiting and not entering the Gulf. This is due to be published in the form of a navigational notice, however some diplomatic and practical issues remain.

Mine clearance has not officially started as yet and according to the MoU, the State with primary responsibility is Iran. It is unclear if European mine clearance capability is within the immediate area, nor if permission has been granted for them to conduct operations.

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Gulf Region update - 18 June: INTERTANKO sets out practical steps to support safe transits through the Strait of Hormuz

INTERTANKO is calling for urgent clarity on the practical steps needed to support the safe transit of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. While the agreement that formally ends the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America is welcome, shipowners need certainty about the practical steps to ensure the safety of navigation and the security of seafarers, to be agreed and implemented.

INTERTANKO sees the two-step reopening of the Straits as a process in which the practical realities and safety of navigation need to be prioritised.

First and foremost, clearing the main internationally recognised traffic separation scheme (TSS) of all mine threats must be a priority. Upon completion, a clear and unequivocal message from all Governments involved needs to be issued to the industry.

During the interim period, while the TSS is being cleared and prior to it being officially declared safe for transit, there needs to be greater clarity on the two alternative Northern and Southern route options to ensure the safe transit of vessels into and out of the Gulf.

Key vessel management and transit information needs to be considered, agreed on, and communicated to ships in the region and to those intending to transit the Strait. If the two TSS-alternative routes are to be used during the interim period, then there needs to be clarity on the following points:

  • Mine clearance to start at the earliest point.
  • Mine danger areas need to be published.
  • Jamming and spoofing of Global Navigation Satellite Systems should cease.
  • Ships should be assured that they will no longer be subject to attack.
  • Assurance that the threat of mines has been eliminated from these alternative routes.
  • A command-and-control system should be put in place to manage the traffic during the early stages. If 550 ships are aiming to leave and a likely 60 ships per day would look to transit the Strait of Hormuz, then the existing routes are inadequate to handle this.
  • How vessels will be managed in terms of transit times and available ‘slots’, including how such transits will be booked and with which entity/single-point of contact
  • A single point of contact, preferably for the entire Strait, but in the interim for each route, with close coordination between them.
  • Clarity on procedures in terms of who to report to and when.
  • The Southern routes moved offshore, the lanes widened, and a lateral separation created between the directions of flow.

Once the main TSS is returned to operation as the primary route, the Northern and Southern routes should be closed.

INTERTANKO Marine Director Phillip Belcher commented, “As we move forward, the status of transit passage through the Strait of Hormuz needs to be emphasised. Article 5 of the MoU states that no tolls will be charged for the first 60 days; however, the future is unclear and will be determined by Iran following dialogue with Oman and discussions with the Gulf States. The final outcome of these discussions must be a reinforcement of the central tenet that the Strait of Hormuz must remain free of charges and open to all in accordance with UNCLOS”.

“Once these steps are taken, the shipping industry should have the reassurance needed to recommence carrying world trade and energy through the area, and seafarers can return to the role for which they are trained, rather than be placed on the front line of a geopolitical conflict.”

Urging continued caution, INTERTANKO Managing Director Tim Wilkins commented, “Without clarity on these issues, ships will be unsure whether to transit the Strait of Hormuz. Some ships will, of course, start to move. That will be natural. But ship owners have adopted a very cautious approach. The safety and security of seafarers have been uppermost in their minds, and no one wishes to jeopardise that safety-first approach when things appear to be moving in the right direction.

We must remind all States involved that the internationally recognised TSS was introduced in 1968 to support the safe transit of internationally trading deep water vessels and to avoid the navigational risks, and so ensure safety at sea.“

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Gulf Region update - 15 June: INTERTANKO welcomes agreement between Iran and the United States

The agreement between the United States and Iran should bring welcome relief to all seafarers in the region. Too many of them have been killed and injured in this conflict and our thoughts are with them and their families.

Whilst INTERTANKO awaits clarifications on the administrative and practical arrangements governing the Strait of Hormuz, we would expect that all parties should recognise that the free flow of the world’s trade and right of transit passage must be reinstated at the earliest point.

INTERTANKO Managing Director Tim Wilkins commented, “We urge the US and Iranian administrations to collaborate in ensuring the Strait of Hormuz is free from the threat of mines, while split navigation between the so-called Omani and Iranian routes should be halted. Freedom of navigation must be reintroduced using the internationally recognised Traffic Separation Scheme.”

Commenting on next steps, INTERTANKO Marine Director Phillip Belcher said, “As this agreement is not due to be signed until Friday 19th June, for ships that need to transit the Strait of Hormuz, a cautious approach should be undertaken. The industry has developed guidelines for use in the event of the Strait reopening, and these should be consulted. A ship-specific risk assessment must be undertaken as detailed in the guidance.” The guidance can be accessed here.

As we look to the future, INTERTANKO trusts that the Strait of Hormuz can never again be used as a weapon, nor that innocent seafarers be caught up in geopolitical conflicts that are none of their making, but which they bear the deadly consequences.

INTERTANKO has updated its advice on Strait of Hormuz transits as below:

  • Follow the BMP Maritime Security and report as required.
  • Follow the advice of the JMIC and EUNAVFOR and avoid the area as much as possible until the situation is clear.
  • If possible, delay transits through the Strait of Hormuz until the situation is clearer.
  • Liaise with the USN NCAGS, EUNAVFOR and UKMTO and report suspicious activity.
  • Due to concerns raised by JMIC following ships being attacked who are transmitting the AIS information, consider your AIS and LRIT policy in Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz. If turning off LRIT, the ship’s flag State administration must be informed.
  • If passing through the area, to stay as far from Iran as possible.
  • Do not pay fees for transits to Iranian forces
  • UPDATED: Ships passing through the Strait and following novel routes, such as the Omani route, should only do so following thorough risk and navigational assessments, taking into account the very latest information from competent authorities.
  • Navigate as far from Yemen as navigationally possible and consider AIS policy.
  • Following the ship specific risk assessment, when it is decided that it is safe to pass through the area, Masters should consider the possibility of encountering heavy traffic and continue to apply the COLREGs.
  • As jamming and spoofing of GPS and other GNSS is taking place, cross check against other methods.
  • Undertake a shipboard security drill.
  • Only rely upon information from trusted sources.

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Gulf Region Update 12 June: Conflict inching towards resolution

Diplomatic activity between the US and Iran continues facilitated by regional partners. The memorandum of understanding (MoU) is based upon a 14-point plan that would reopen the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), and remove the US blockade. Other issues are reported to cover respecting Iranian sovereignty, confirming that Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons, release of frozen Iranian assets and removing sanctions on Iran. The US is very upbeat on the possibility of this being agreed in a very short timescale, whereas Iran has stated that there is more to discuss. It should be noted that such claims about being very close to a resolution have previously been made multiple times.

Whilst the diplomatic activity continues, so does a low scale conflict between the US and Iran. Multiple drones have been fired across the SoH and these have been shot down by the US air patrols. These air patrols are in place to provide support to shipping following the route around the Omani coast. The US has conducted multiple strikes against Iranian targets and the Iranians have responded with missile attacks across the region.

The US has continued to enforce its blockade on Iranian trade and have attacked three ships in the last week. These have been undertaken by firing missiles into the engine room of the ship. INTERTANKO has repeatedly requested that the US halt attacks in this manner. In one attack, three Indian seafarers were killed.

Ships continue to pass through the SoH in both the Iranian and Omani routes. The Omani route carries up to 15 ships per day. Passages are undertaken at night and INTERTANKO has provided advice to the US in how to reduce the significant navigational risks involved in this route. Since the ceasefire on 8 April, just over 200 transits have occurred along this route.

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Gulf Region Update 5 June: Diplomacy inching forward as attacks occur

If the noise of social media is ignored, diplomacy does appear to be working, as steady, but slow progress appears to be taking place between the US and Iran in the agreement for the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

The MoU will set the terms of a more permanent ceasefire between the belligerents. It has been reported that this would be for an initial 60-day period in which the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) would be reopened without restrictions, the US blockade will be removed, and Iran would be able to export oil whilst receiving part of their offshore frozen funds. The MoU would also set the terms for ongoing talks to finalise the terms of a formal peace deal which would include issues such as the final status of the SoH, Iranian nuclear programmes, and security guarantees.

Whilst these negotiations are underway, violence has continued across the Gulf Region. On Wednesday 3 June, Kuwait airport suffered a significant attack from Iran and Iran launched multiple missiles and drones at US targets in Bahrain.

The US has continued to strike sites Iranian targets around the SoH which have been used to launch drones or facilitate attacks against shipping. These US attacks have been in support of shipping within the so-called Omani route. The procedure for this route includes close liaison with the US Navy where timings and waypoints of routes will be passed over. Whilst underway in the route, the US advise that the ship should be blacked out with navigational lights off. Radar use should be minimised and AIS turned off. The navigational situation of the route is difficult with close sailing to the Omani and UAE coastlines.

For the deconfliction between vessels, the timing of the in-bound and out-bound groups (not convoys) enables the ships to pass in wider areas. Around 15 ships use this route per day. Transits take place at night and the numbers are split between both directions. INTERTANKO has raised concerns over the safety of navigation and suggested amendments to the routes to facilitate a higher level of navigational safety.

Once the MoU is in place, with a more permanent ceasefire in place, the wider UK/French-led coalition of the willing should be able to operate in the Gulf Region and provide support to shipping. However, despite progress, the diplomatic talks need to run their course and during this time, only trusted sources should be relied upon.

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Gulf Region Update 29 May: Light at the end of the tunnel, but mine threat remains

Negotiations between the US and Iran appear to be reaching a positive outcome, with discussions focussing on a memorandum of understanding (MoU) regarding future talks to resolve the conflict.

The agreement appears to be coalescing around a 60-day extension of the current ceasefire. During this time, Iran will allow traffic flows back to pre-conflict levels. There is some confusion over whether this traffic flow would be ‘administered’ by Iran or it would revert to pre-conflict arrangements. In return, the US would remove its blockade and possibly release frozen Iranian funds. The final point appears to be that Iran would remove all mines from the region.

It should be stressed that this is not a peace deal, but what could be considered an agreement on the base conditions coupled with the agenda for wider peace talks. It should also be noted that previous peace talks that created the Iran nuclear deal lasted for many years. Further, the air strikes by the US against drones launched across the Strait of Hormuz, and the Iranian attack on a US base in Kuwait, demonstrate the fragility of the current ceasefire.

On the issue of mines, in addition to the mines that have been documented in the Traffic Separation Scheme, a report from the US Navy highlighted that a mine has been seen in the route advised by the USN along the coast of Oman and UAE. The location is in the vicinity of the Musandam Peninsula at the tip of Oman. It is unclear whether this is a new mine, one that has been there for some time, or one that has drifted into the area.

It would appear that the mine threat may be encountered in areas previously believed to be clear. For ships that have decided to transit, the latest situation on mines and other threats will be provided by the US Navy and coordination should be undertaken through the US NCAGS in Bahrain. In support of mine clearance operations by the French/UK-led coalition of the willing, the UK’s civilian naval support vessel, RFA Lyme Bay, has departed Gibraltar and is expected to join the growing coalition, focused around the French aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle. It is expected to be in the region within the next two weeks.

For ships that do decide to transit, following the ship specific risk assessment, then the US Navy will provide a coordinates of a route through Omani and UAE waters. They will also advise that:

  • Transit of the Strait of Hormuz should be undertaken at night.
  • Ship should be blacked out without any lights including navigational lights.
  • AIS, LRIT and other emissions switched off.
  • Mobile phones should be switched off.
  • Radars should only be used when necessary.

INTERTANKO is not endorsing this approach, but is providing the information as provided by the USN. Consultations should also be made with your insurer. It should be noted that they are processing many enquiries and it may take over 24 hours before they respond. Their email is: m-ba-navcent-ncags@us.navy.mil

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Gulf Region Update 22 May: Stalemate continues with no resolution

Diplomatic discussions continue between the governments of the United States and Iran, focusing upon the nuclear ambitions of Iran, Iranian frozen assets seized in third countries, guarantees of security for Iran, ending of the conflict across the region and control of the Strait of Hormuz. As we go to press, no common ground has yet to be found.

Limited movements of ships through the Strait of Hormuz continues with approximately 10% of the volume of traffic pre-war. Transiting vessels are split between those gaining permission from Iran and so transiting through the Iranian designated routes and those hugging the Omani coast, attempting to pass unnoticed.

While the US has said that it will provide some form of oversight for ships passing along the Omani coast, this is only overwatch and not active protection. More information for ships will be gained by contacting the US NCAGs in Bahrain. Members should note that mines remain uncleared within the central section of the Strait of Hormuz, however, there are no credible reports of mines being laid in Omani waters.

The first meeting of detailed planning for the UK/French coalition of the willing of some 40-plus countries who will support any diplomatic resolution with naval support, has now commenced. It is likely that command will be by the UK, with direction being given from a joint UK/French operational centre modelled on the MDAT GoG system. In support of this coalition, a French task force, centred around the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, is operating in the Gulf of Aden. This is also supported by warships from Italy and the UK.

Mine clearance support from the UK should be within the region in approximately two weeks, with a likely timescale for clearance expected to be two to four weeks after that.

The recently released industry guidance on navigation in the Strait of Hormuz has been passed to the planning team.

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Gulf Region Update 15 May: Stalemate continues

In the last week, little has changed in the region. Several ships have been threatened and there is a report of a livestock carrying dhow that has been attacked and sunk. All 14 crew from the vessel are safe and no injuries have been reported. A trickle of ships has continued to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, both along the coast of Oman as well as through the northern Iranian-controlled route.

Most eyes were watching the developments surrounding the State visit by the US President to China. However, there appears to have been little progress at this meeting with regards to the Gulf region.

The IMO Secretary General expressed his frustration at the lack of cooperation between coastal States at the opening session of the Maritime Safety Committee at IMO on Wednesday 13th May. Planning continues among various stakeholders on exit routes, but all are predicated on the cessation of hostilities between the belligerents.

Whilst this lack of progress is not harming seafarers, they still remain in a state of limbo within the Gulf Region and we continue to work on their behalf.

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Middle East update – 1 May: Frozen conflict continues

The situation in the Persian Gulf remains in a frozen state with all sides respecting the ceasefire. However, the blockade by the US and measures taken by Iran, means that traffic remains at a near standstill.

Due to the lack of diplomatic movement and that Iran has a veto on traffic movements through the threat of violence, none of the UN-based plans have seen any movement. The US is initiating plans that will take several weeks to commence – even the first planning meetings with industry. Additionally, the threat of mines requires extreme caution in any navigation through the area. Therefore, there is no expectation that even limited navigation will recommence in the next two weeks.

Planning, led by INTERTANKO, for safe navigation continues with various inter-industry working groups and meetings being held in conjunction with the IMO. Briefings and meetings continue between the Secretariat and multiple member States. 

The welfare of seafarers remains at the forefront of efforts and communications and discussions with labour-supplying States, such as the Philippines, continue. As we go to press, the Philippines Department of Migrant Workers is poised to issue a revised note allowing crew changes on a case-by-case basis following a risk assessment and statements by the incoming crew that they are content to join the vessel.

The US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued new FAQs on 28 April which confirm that US-linked entities cannot make payments directly or indirectly for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz and that “such payments also create significant sanctions exposure for non-US persons”.

The FAQs can be downloaded here https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1249.

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Middle East update – 24 April: Escapes, seizures, and ceasefires

The situation in the Persian Gulf remains difficult for all. There are some positive signs in that the US has unilaterally indefinitely extended its ceasefire and the ceasefire in the Lebanon has also been extended. However, Iran has now seized ships, the US has arrested ships breaching its imposed blockade, and there is no end in sight to the overall situation.

As we went to press last Friday, a dramatic series of events occurred. The Iranian Foreign Minister announced that following the ceasefire in the Lebanon, the Strait of Hormuz would be open for all if they followed the Iranian route. The US President confirmed this and thanked Iran. A large group of ships immediately headed for the exit and INTERTANKO published a statement which outlined some concerns.

However, the Strait was open for only a short period of time and the concerns exercised in INTERTANKO’s statement came to the fore with the exercise of control by the IRGC over the Strait. While close to 40 ships did escape, several ships were attacked by the IRGC and the majority of ships returned to the Persian Gulf.

On the 22 April, a group of six MSC containerships with several other ships joining it, made a move to leave. This resulted in three ships being fired at, with one suffering damage to the bridge and another being hit by a projectile. Two ships were then seized by Iran and they remain anchored in Iranian waters with their crew on board.

The US has arrested approximately six ships for breaching their unilaterally imposed blockade. Some of these arrests have been undertaken at great distance from the Persian Gulf.

The current situation remains where Iran is allowing some ships to depart using its designated corridors. Members who have departed on this route have stated that they receive instructions form their charterer and then follow those. They have stated that no payments have been made. The situation relating to mines is that it is strongly believed that mines have been sown in the area of the Traffic Separation Scheme and it will take considerable efforts to ensure that no mines remain.

INTERTANKO continues to work with all stakeholders including through both military and diplomatic routes to find solutions to the issues of safe and free navigation and alongside the humanitarian issue for seafarers in the area. Our current advice is shown below:

  • Follow the BMP Maritime Security and report as required.
  • Follow the advice of the JMIC and EUNAVFOR and avoid the area as much as possible until the situation is clear.
  • If possible, delay transits through the Strait of Hormuz until the situation is clearer.
  • Liaise with the USN NCAGS, EUNAVFOR and UKMTO and report suspicious activity.
  • Due to concerns raised by JMIC following ships being attacked who are transmitting the AIS information, consider your AIS and LRIT policy in Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz. If turning off LRIT, the ship’s flag State administration must be informed.
  • If passing through the area, to stay as far from Iran as possible.
  • Do not pay fees for transits to Iranian forces
  • Ships passing through the Strait and following novel routes, such as the Omani route, should only do so following a through risk and navigational assessment and taking into account the very latest information from competent authorities.
  • Navigate as far from Yemen as navigationally possible and consider AIS policy.
  • Following the ship-specific risk assessment, when it is decided that it is safe to pass through the area, Masters should consider the possibility of encountering heavy traffic and continue to apply the COLREGs.
  • As jamming and spoofing of GPS and other GNSS is taking place, cross check against other methods.
  • Undertake a shipboard security drill.
  • Only rely upon information from trusted sources.

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Middle East update – 17 April: US blockade commences and ceasefire holds

The US-Iran ceasefire put into effect on 7 April, is due to expire on 21 April, however, there is widespread expectation it will be extended.

All sides appear to be respecting the ceasefire and attacks in the Persian Gulf region have halted, with no ship attacked since 7 April. Under the terms of the ceasefire, all transits through the Strait of Hormuz are meant to do so under the control of the Iranian military. A ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah also entered into force on 17 April covering the Levant region. Separate ceasefires between the Houthis and the US, and the Houthis and Saudi Arabia remain in force. 

Face-to-face talks between the US and Iran failed to reach any conclusion on 11 April. following this, the US government announced a blockade of all ports and terminals along the entire coast of Iran, which came into effect at 1400 UTC on 13 April. The following is what we understand the blockade means in practice:

Applies to:   Entire Iranian coastline
                    All ports and terminals in Iran
                    All traffic to and from those ports
                    All ships carrying contraband (weapons, dual use equipment, nuclear materials, prohibited hydrocarbons, and computers)
                    All OFAC sanctioned vessels
End date:    Likely after a peace deal

Probably applies to:
                   Any Iranian flagged ship
 Exemptions:
                  Any neutral ship not calling in Iran
                  Ships carrying humanitarian shipments
                  Ships authorised by the US to call in Iranian ports

Due to concerns raised over the payment of fees to any entity designated by the US, UK, EU, and many other States as a terrorist organisation, the likelihood is that the US will not allow passage of any ship that has paid the Iranians and the central principle of freedom of navigation that no restrictions should be in place. INTERTANKO advises that ships should not pay fees for transit through these waters.

Other initiatives involving creating corridors for ships to be able to leave or enter the Persian Gulf region continue. These range from the IMO’s humanitarian evacuation corridor, the wider UN work on resumption of trade, and a coalition of the willing whose diplomatic efforts are led jointly by France and the UK. Both countries are meeting today (17 April) in Paris to formulate plans for a 40-country strong coalition to allow for freedom of navigation to recommence.

INTERTANKO’s draft plan on advice related to the safety of navigation is now under review by a coalition of the industry including OCIMF and the Round Table. The intention is for it to be issued as an industry-wide effort to assist in ensuring that ships are able to navigate safely when the situation is safe enough to resume transits.

INTERTANKO remains active in the efforts to assist in the international coordination of the response, the safety of navigation, and the humanitarian needs of seafarers. Further advice will be issued when required. Particular effort is now being directed at those Members who have ships stuck inside the Persian Gulf.

INTERTANKO advice as of 15 April 2026:

  • Follow the BMP Maritime Security and report as required.
  • Follow the advice of the JMIC and EUNAVFOR and avoid the area as much as possible until the situation is clear.
  • If possible, delay transits through the Strait of Hormuz until the situation is clearer.
  • Liaise with the USN NCAGS, EUNAVFOR and UKMTO and report suspicious activity.
  • Due to concerns raised by JMIC following ships being attacked who are transmitting the AIS information, consider your AIS and LRIT policy in Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz. If turning off LRIT, the ship’s flag State administration must be informed.
  • If passing through the area, to stay as far from Iran as possible.
  • NEW: Do not pay fees for transits to Iranian forces.
  • The inshore traffic separation scheme in the Strait of Hormuz may be used to avoid immediate danger, however, this is not recommended for routine transits, due to the risk of collision.
  • Navigate as far from Yemen as navigationally possible and consider AIS policy.
  • Following the ship-specific risk assessment, when it is decided that it is safe to pass through the area, Masters should consider the possibility of encountering heavy traffic and continue to apply the COLREGs.
  • As jamming and spoofing of GPS and other GNSS is taking place, cross check against other methods.
  • Undertake a shipboard security drill.
  • Only rely upon information from trusted sources.

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Middle East update – 16 April: US blockade commences and ceasefire holds

The conflict in the Persian Gulf region can be classified as being on hold. The ceasefire put into effect on 7 April, still has one week to run. All sides appear to be respecting the ceasefire and attacks in the Persian Gulf region. Under the terms of that ceasefire, all transits through the Strait of Hormuz are meant to do so under the control of the Iranian military.

Face to face talks between the US and Iran failed to reach any conclusion following talks on 11 April. The US government announced a blockade of all ports and terminals along the entire coast of Iran. This came into effect at 1400UTC on 13 April. The following is what we understand the blockade means in practice:

Applies to:

Entire Iranian coastline
All ports and terminals in Iran
All traffic to and from those ports
All ships carrying contraband

Applied from:

1400 UTC 13 April

Probably applies to:

Any ship that pays a fee/toll to Iran
Any Iranian flagged ship

 Exemptions:    

Any neutral ship not calling in Iran
Ships carrying humanitarian shipments
Ships authorised by the US to call in Iranian ports

Due to the concerns raised over the payment of fees to any entity designated by the US, UK, EU, and many other States as a terrorist organisation and the likelihood that the US will not allow passage of any ship that has paid the Iranians, INTERTANKO advises that ships should not pay fees for transit through these waters. This advice will be added to the comprehensive advice below.

For mines, the latest JMIC advisory states:

“Operators should treat the traffic separation scheme (TSS) and adjacent waters as a potential mine-risk area until mine locations have been verified and threats to transiting ships mitigated.”

Other initiatives on creating corridors for ships to be able to leave or enter the Persian Gulf region continues. These range from the IMO’s humanitarian evacuation corridor, the wider UN work on resumption of trade, and a coalition of the willing whose diplomatic efforts are led jointly by France and the UK.

INTERTANKO’s draft plan on advice related to the safety of navigation is now under review by a coalition of the industry including OCIMF and the Round Table. The intention is for this to be issued as an industry wide effort to assist in ensuring that ships are able to navigate safely when the situation is safe enough to resume transits.

INTERTANKO remains active in the efforts to assist in the international coordination of the response, the safety of navigation, and the humanitarian needs of seafarers. Further advice will be issued when required. Particular effort is now being directed at those members who have ships stuck inside the Persian Gulf.

See bottom of the page for INTERTANKO’s latest advice.

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Middle East update – 10 April: Fragile ceasefire holding in Persian Gulf region

A fragile peace based upon a two-week ceasefire brokered by Pakistan, is holding in the Persian Gulf region.

This is welcomed and exists as a pre-cursor for detailed talks between the US and Iran due to formally commence in Islamabad on Saturday 11 April. Whilst Israel appears not to be part of the ceasefire agreement, it has stated that it will halt attacks on Iran.

Unlike in ceasefires in other conflicts, no definitive ceasefire agreement has been published. This means that the warring factions continue to interpret the situation as they see fit. Israel, for example, has interpreted the agreement to be on only covering Iran and so it has continued to strike targets in Lebanon and elsewhere. Similarly, the agreement in its various versions talks to a full and complete reopening of the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). Iran claims that the SoH is now open. However, Iran continues to exercise complete control on this international waterway by threatening to attack any ship that tries to pass through without its permission. Therefore, the current situation should be seen as a cessation of violence, rather than a complete ceasefire agreement.

The current situation in the Persian Gulf remains one where conflict could break out at very short notice, the SoH is effectively closed with only around 15 ships passing through per day and Iran exercising a veto on the ships that pass through. The Gulf countries have rejected a long-term solution where Iran retains control of the SoH and Oman in particular has rejected the idea of tolls being levied upon ships.

The IMO continues to develop the humanitarian evacuation corridor for ships to leave the Persian Gulf. The concept for this is that ships will be able to leave the region so as to focus upon the humanitarian needs of the seafarers. More detailed plans have been provided to the Omani and Iranian authorities for their approval. No timeline is currently in place for the execution of this plan. In wider UN-led initiatives, a large group of UN agencies such as FAO and UNCTAD are working with the UN Secretary General’s personal envoy Jean Arnault of France, to facilitate a plan to reopen the SoH to facilitate trade. The priority for this work will be to allow the passage of fertiliser. Again, no timeline is available for this plan.

INTERTANKO’s Nautical Sub-Committee has developed a plan covering safety of navigation once the area is no longer subject to indiscriminate attack. This plan is now being worked on by the Round Table organisations plus OCIMF with a view to being issued as an industry-wide plan. It is expected that this will be available by the end of next week.

INTERTANKO’s advice remains unchanged at this time - see below.

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Middle East update 13 March – No deescalation in sight

The conflict continues with no sign of reduction in the threat to ships within the Gulf region.

Approximately 20 ships have now been attacked, resulting in the deaths of at least 11 seafarers and life-changing injuries for others. Attacks have occurred on ships across the region, from off Kuwait to deep into the Gulf of Oman.

Ships with association to the US, China, and Iran itself have all suffered hits from Iranian forces. A single digit number of ships have passed through the region and the Strait of Hormuz, however, the Strait remains extremely dangerous and unsafe for general navigation.

The threat of mines remains only a threat, with no evidence provided from military and intelligence sources. No escorting or physical support from naval vessels is available in the region and there is no timeline for this support.

The Houthis have not taken any steps to enter the conflict, but the group retains a considerable arsenal and this is held at a high state of readiness. However, the JMIC and others assess that the Houthis are currently not preparing to attack ships.

The JMIC has stated that the threat level is CRITICAL, which means that an attack is almost certain.

The JMIC briefings can be downloaded here:

https://www.ukmto.org/partner-products/jmic-products/jmic-advisories/2026

INTERTANKO continues to work with the military and intelligence authorities across a broad range of States, as well as our industry and welfare partners. Close liaison has been maintained with the European Commission and the IMO.

An ad hoc working group of INTERTANKO’s Nautical Sub-Committee has commenced work on plans to assist in the safe navigation of ships within the area. The aim is to manage any sudden rush of transits through the area once either support is available or the area is deemed to be safe enough for general transit.

The IMO will be holding an emergency extraordinary session next week and INTERTANKO is currently coordinating a submission that highlights the issues faced by seafarers in the region and some practical steps to be taken to provide some relief. These are in line with the three aspects that are driving INTERTANKO’s work:

  • Seafarer Welfare
  • Safety of Navigation
  • Coordinated military support.

INTERTANKO will continue to respond to issues raised by Members and provide support through advice and guidance.

Following discussions with the most trusted sources, INTERTANKO offers the following advice to Members as of 15 April:

  • Follow the BMP Maritime Security and report as required.
  • Follow the advice of the JMIC and EUNAVFOR and avoid the area as much as possible until the situation is clear.
  • If possible, delay transits through the Strait of Hormuz until the situation is clearer.
  • Liaise with the USN NCAGS, EUNAVFOR and UKMTO and report suspicious activity.
  • Due to concerns raised by JMIC following ships being attacked who are transmitting the AIS information, consider your AIS and LRIT policy in Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz. If turning off LRIT, the ship’s flag State administration must be informed.
  • If passing through the area, to stay as far from Iran as possible.
  • NEW: Do not pay fees for transits to Iranian forces
  • The inshore traffic separation scheme in the Strait of Hormuz may be used to avoid immediate danger, however, this is not recommended for routine transits, due to the risk of collision.
  • Navigate as far from Yemen as navigationally possible and consider AIS policy.
  • Following the ship specific risk assessment, when it is decided that it is safe to pass through the area, Masters should consider the possibility of encountering heavy traffic and continue to apply the COLREGs.
  • As jamming and spoofing of GPS and other GNSS is taking place, cross check against other methods.
  • Undertake a shipboard security drill.
  • Only rely upon information from trusted sources.

INTERTANKO will continue to provide further updates as necessary as the situation develops.

Contact: Phil Belcher

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